Al-Dabiba: Stage decisions or necessity


again, Abdul Hamid al-Dabiba, head of the national unity government, was surprised. Everyone made a bold decision related to the establishment of a new agency under the name “The National Agency for Supporting Forces”, It means starting to include in the apparatus “the members of the supporting forces from the formations and battalions of the February 17 revolutionaries,” To reorganize it, organize its movement, and place the mechanisms, weapons and ammunition in its possession. As stated in the text of the decision, And in accordance with Resolution No. (313 of 2023) establishing the National Agency for Supportive Forces, It shall be independent financially. with broad powers, It reports directly to the Council of Ministers and enjoys a legal personality. Its headquarters shall be Tripoli. The decision came with a specific number of tasks and powers, which are: –

  • Preserving the objectives of the February 17 revolution. According to the legal legislation in force in the Libyan state.
  • protect the legitimacy of the state and sovereign institutions, Preserving the security and stability of the country and its national security.
  • army support, As necessary to help secure and protect the Libyan borders and ports, Securing vital and strategic objectives and facilities.
  • Support the Ministry of the Interior when needed, In the protection of sovereign headquarters and the headquarters of diplomatic missions.
  • Support in emergencies, natural disasters and rescue operations.
  • Support in securing infrastructure projects. archaeological and tourist sites.
  • Any competencies assigned to the device later.

Read about the outputs of the decision and its possible effects

It is worth noting that the most important decision is after the clear and explicit February, and what this decision constitutes of an urgent need and desire that the actors and leaders of February had hoped to achieve over the past years, and worked hard to expose it to all successive transitional governments, but the response was non-existent, and the responses were shocking. Therefore, the level of audacity in the decision is unprecedented. Al-Dabaiba was able to sense the need for these forces, and to make this decision and its effects a solid body, with which he can bet and maneuver in his struggle, and his quest to continue ruling, as long as possible. In particular, that The decision stipulates that the apparatus is directly subordinate to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and that the decision of the head of the apparatus is issued by the Prime Minister, which is what Abdul Hameed al-Dabaiba did, by issuing a decision stipulating the assignment of “Ahmed Ali Khalil Issa,” who is from Misrata and a relative of one of the most important businessmen supporting the government. Al-Dabaiba, so the direct subordination of the decision to the prime minister will cast a shadow over its consequences and political goals. Especially since the political debate is at its most intense between the Libyan factions, as the decision will explain, that it will be supportive of the government’s efforts in its recent announcement of launching a campaign to purify Zawiya and the western region from gangs Various smuggling, and corruption barons “according to what the government announced,” and that it is an attempt to clamp down more and more on the opponents of this campaign, and that this decision will pull the rug from under them, especially if it is supported and strengthened in a way that suits the requirements of necessity that serve the idea of ​​expanding the government’s influence in the Libyan West. From another angle, the critics of this decision believe that if the mechanisms for organizing and managing this apparatus are not professionally, effectively and professionally controlled, it is possible that this apparatus will emulate in an advanced stage the experience of the decision of the “Rapid Support” apparatus established by the isolated Sudanese President “Omar al-Bashir” and what It caused and resulted in disasters for Sudan at the present time, in addition to the inflation of bodies parallel to the official state agencies, with the duplication and overlapping of tasks and powers between them, which will weaken these agencies, and make their leaders feel marginalized and deprived of their powers. On the other hand, supporters of this decision believe that it came at the right time. It is appropriate, and that the need to integrate and unify the groups of fighters who joined the security and military apparatus of the February 17 revolutionaries is a matter that serves the interest and stability of the state, and prevents the conspiracy that preys on the February leaders and works to fragment, disperse and weaken them, in service of the military’s project. The accurate diagnosis of the previous stage also records That the international and regional intelligence tampering is one of the reasons for the appearance of the February personalities, with the appearance of chaos and corruption, and branding them with the owners of agendas, through their identification with the peg of political Islam, so the supporters of this decision are betting that this body will create the institutional military and security entity with the national faith, which Local and foreign parties have been fighting its existence, and that it will absolutely not be a militia body, and they will not allow it, and that its leaders will make it a model for the disciplined and successful military establishment.


The issuance of this decision brings to mind a set of decisions previously issued in approximately the same time and political circumstance that it is going through by the head of the Government of National Accord, “Fayez al-Sarraj”, such as issuing the decision to establish the “Support and Stability” apparatus, under Resolution No. (26/2021) and giving it Broad powers equivalent to the powers and tasks of the Ministry of the Interior. Likewise, Resolution No. (578/2021), which stipulates the establishment of the “deterrence apparatus to combat organized crime and terrorism,” and made its direct subordination to the President of the Presidential Council, and based on this decision, the “Special Deterrence Force” affiliated to the Ministry of Defense was dissolved. The Ministry of Interior, and the inclusion of all its employees in the new apparatus, the “Deterrence Force”, with the same employment conditions they were in at the time of the issuance of the decision, and the decision stipulated that “all immovable and movable assets that were in the possession of the Special Deterrence Force, including the public force of weapons and ammunition, shall be transferred to the new apparatus.” “. These two decisions were given multiple powers and tasks to these two bodies equivalent to the powers and tasks of the Ministry of Interior, the official institution of the state, and thus it became as if there were three police institutions with the same tasks and powers, in one geographical area. The overlapping of military and security agencies and formations, in terms of tasks and powers, with the official state institutions, is one of the negative phenomena that affect the stability of the state, works to weaken its authority, undermine the rule of law, and destabilize political and societal stability, because of the confrontational nature of these formations with each other, and the inability On the discipline and respect of the military hierarchy of its personnel, due to the weakness of professional and professional training and practice. This overlap also indicates the use of the influence of these devices and formations to not strengthen the centralization of the principle of power of the state and its official institutions from the Ministries of Defense and Security, with the possibility of using these formations and devices, by the government Executive, especially the head of government due to its direct subordination to him, in his political struggle, and the government’s authority over its opponents.

Here, a set of questions may come to mind in particular

  • How likely is the decision to become a reality? Despite the great controversy around him? , Does the military establishment accept the existence of a parallel entity over which it has no control? Or he obeys her orders, which increases her fragmentation and division??.
  • To what extent is the “great friend” devoted to allocating the necessary financial budgets for his success?? Is it separate from the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defense??
  • Can the international and regional dimension have an impact on the implementation of the decision or not??
  • What is the impact of this decision on the political track?? Will such a decision reinforce the principle of political oppression and tyranny and the non-peaceful transfer of power?? Especially since his direct dependence will be on the Prime Minister.


Resolution text

Resolution No. 313 of 2023 AD to establish the National Agency for Supporting Forces

Council of Ministers

After viewing

On the Constitutional Declaration issued on August 3, 2011 AD, and its modifications.

And the Libyan Political Agreement signed on December 17, 2015 AD.

And on the outcomes of the Libyan Dialogue Forum held on November 19, 2020 AD.

And the law of the financial system of the state and the regulation of the budget, accounts and warehouses and their amendments.

And Law No. 40 of 1974 regarding service in the Libyan army and its amendments.

And Law No. 12 of 2010 AD, regarding the issuance of the Employment Relationships Law.

And what the House of Representatives decided on March 10, 2021, to grant confidence to the national unity government.

And the letter of the Secretary of Cabinet Affairs No. 10284 dated 05/22/2023 AD.

And the third regular meeting of the Council of Ministers for the year 2023 AD.

He decided

Article 1

An agency called the National Agency for Supporting Forces shall be established under the Council of Ministers. It shall enjoy legal personality and independent financial liability. Its main headquarters shall be in Tripoli.

Article 2

The apparatus includes members of the support forces from the formations and brigades of the February 17 revolutionaries, to reorganize them, regulate their movement, and put the mechanisms, weapons and ammunition in their possession in accordance with administrative and legal procedures and applicable legislation.

Article 3

By members of the support forces, it means:

  • February 17 revolutionaries.
  • Participants in military operations to defend the homeland from civilians.
  • Trainers from the military and security agencies who will be assigned to the agency.

Article 4

The agency assumes the following specializations:

  • Preserving the goals of the February 17 revolution in accordance with the legal legislation in force in the Libyan state.
  • Protecting the legitimacy of the state and sovereign institutions and preserving the security, stability and national security of the country.
  • Supporting the army, as necessary, to help secure and protect the Libyan borders and ports, and to secure vital and strategic targets and facilities.
  • Supporting the Ministry of Interior when needed in protecting the sovereign headquarters and the headquarters of diplomatic missions.
  • Support in emergencies, natural disasters and rescue operations.
  • Support in securing infrastructure projects and archaeological and touristic sites.
  • Any competencies assigned to the device later.

Article 5

The agency is managed by a chairperson whose designation is issued by a decision of the Prime Minister.

Article 6

The agency shall have branches affiliated to it in the Libyan cities according to a proposal submitted by the head of the agency and a decision of the Prime Minister shall be issued in this regard.

Article 7

The chief of the agency is responsible for executing the tasks according to the competencies of the agency. He is also responsible before the law for anything that conflicts with the tasks of the agency in accordance with the legal legislation.

Article 8

The Authority’s financial resources consist of the following:

  • What amounts are allocated to him from the state’s general budget.
  • Any other resources he is legally authorized to obtain.

Article 9

The Agency shall have one or more bank accounts in one of the banks operating in Libya, in which its funds shall be deposited in accordance with the legislation in force.

Article 10

This decision shall be enforced from the date of its issuance. The competent authorities shall implement it.

Council of Ministers

June 7, 2023

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