The Libyan Political Scene: Pathways and policies
D. Abdul wahab Muhammad Alhar
Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Misurata University.
Thesummary:
The Libyan crisis represents a special case as it is associated with dramatic and fast-paced changes since 2011 through its various stations, and this is due to two main factors, the first is related to the lack of a mature institutional structure that follows the paths of settlement and achieves levels of stability, which deepens the scene of chaos and crisis and with it maps of conflicts and alliances increase continuously.The second factor is related to the nature of the political change in 2011, which necessitated a military intervention to overthrow the regime of Colonel Gaddafi, which opened the way for many external interventions and confusing the scene. From this point of view, this paper is concerned with trying to think about three levels of analysis:
- Maps of the current political forces.
- Successive crises in the Libyan political scene.
- Settlement Paths and Outcomes.
Keywords: The Libyan crisis – the Libyan scene – the paths of settlement, Political change – external interventions.
Introduction:
The Libyan crisis has gone through many stations and forms of alliances and conflicts, This made Libya one of the arenas for settling international conflicts over influence, influence and interests between major countries and regional countries, which directly and explicitly affected the course of events in the Libyan scene. Which is living in a state of societal division over many issues that are fundamental to the establishment of the state and the system of government.
Society is not familiar with the culture of dialogue and is haunted by a tribal imagination that magnifies the tribe’s biography, raises its status and gives it loyalties. Not to mention the great controversy over identity and political personality, All this accompanied the state in its three stages, However, the absence of central authority since 2011, its fragility and often lack of legitimacy, and the proliferation of armed forces, Making the state live successive transitional phases with which the phenomena of conflicts, alliances and polarizations deepened, making it difficult to achieve political stability and thus political crises rolled over, From the difficulty of weaving agreement on a constitution that regulates political life and brings it out of a state of improvisation and chaos to a state of rationality, Predicting the outcome of the settlement and resolution of the Libyan crisis has become extremely complex and difficult.
From this standpoint, the basic assumption in this paper is based on the fact that (the intertwining of the stations of the Libyan scene between the scattered inside and outside is significantly conflicting in its interests, It was directly reflected on the course of events and crises, and thus the paths of settlement and outcomes became more ambiguous and far from achieving the desired stability.
First: Maps of the current political forces:
The nature of the Libyan revolution was clearly reflected in the formation of maps of local forces, alliances and struggles for governance or the exercise of influence and influence. That’s why we see the diversity, emergence and decline of local forces. However, what is constant in them is the continuity of the conflict and submission to foreign parties, Not to mention that most local forces are more or less linked to armed groups, There is also a tribal dimension to the association as some armed groups embody the will of the tribe and their quest to obtain the desired quotas. Some forces also carry a religious orientation linked to the state of interest achieved by the coalition.
An example of this happened in May 2014 when Khalifa Haftar announced his coup in a televised speech[1]The Muslim Brotherhood sided with the government in Tripoli while the Salafist movement allied itself with Khalifa Haftar. The conflict and competition continues between religious currents to this day, including what is related to competition for religious and media platforms between the (Salafi current) and (Sufi current) or (Mufti movement), which are serious conflicts and rivalries that directly threaten stability, not to mention that there are affiliated armed groups that can line up for any political opponents.
Realistically, the political division in Libya created maps of armed conflict, and the invasion of Tripoli on 04/04/2019 may be the last episode, but it will not be the last, The existence of two governments and the constant quest for control of Tripoli have become everyone’s obsession. The centralization of the state has perpetuated this imagination. Whoever controls Tripoli controls Libya, This was understood by all Libyan political forces. Consequently, successive governments have been subjected to the tacit control of armed militias, whether from inside or outside Tripoli. And do not forget here the state of political division imposed the duality of who controls the oil crescent and who controls Tripoli are qualified to engage in negotiations of understanding on power, positions and wealth. Therefore, the international community, when searching for an authority to govern Libya, has become certain to find it within the equation of influence and influence and has become embodied on the Libyan geography, This is about making alliances and making them according to interests and not at the level of ideas and ideologies. Therefore, parties and community organizations have lost their importance on the maps of political forces, so they need to change their positions and constants whenever the need for political alignment arises.
This can be easily observed in the Libyan scene. Where we saw how the parties were involved in the duality of conflict, which we referred to earlier, Since the Skhirat Agreement, which produced the Government of National Accord, Consisting of eight heads with strong relations and possessing powers on the ground[2], parties were implicitly represented in the government component, but it can be described as the weakest due to the loss of influence and influence in the Libyan political scene, and we can collectively identify three political forces that were able to contain armed groups and ensure their loyalty and protection[3].
1- Western Libya Group:
Derived their strength in being governments with international legitimacy, The first was through the Skhirat Agreement, which produced the Government of National Accord, which was able to deal, contain and submit to armed groups in western Libya, taking advantage of the centralization of institutions. The second was the birth of the Government of National Unity in Geneva, in which it inherited the same nature of dealing with armed groups with a difference in the relative effectiveness of the government’s performance. This birth came through a combination in which the forces changed and the area expanded to include tribal components, people from the former regime, social forces, media activists, politicians and other actors. This combination reflects the extent of the international community’s confusion and the difficulty of the settlement paths to the Libyan crisis. Of course, it reflects differences and disparities that did not succeed in hindering and disrupting political stability unless the external environment that incubated it only existed at the regional and international levels[4].
2- Eastern Libya Group:
It relied on its power to control oil sources and external support from regional countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. Not to mention tribal support and alliances with the forces of the former regime in order to employ them and invest their desire to return in the political scene, taking advantage of the state of political division, employing the House of Representatives, which produced executive powers in multiple stages and exercised powers and competencies within the will of (the General Command of the Army and its submission to General Haftar).
3- Parties claiming neutrality:
In the sense that it adopts the same distance from opponents[5] and deals with the state of division, perhaps in two dimensions, the first is related to being careful not to slide into a state of total chaos and political impasse, The second dimension relates to the personal benefits and interests that may be achieved for some tribal leaders and regional figures in playing the role of reliable societal mediator in moving political tracks. As well as the files of national reconciliation, social justice and the pursuit of community harmony.
To sum up, we say that the map of the Libyan political forces has become limited to the ability of the two parties to the political conflict, namely the national government and Khalifa Haftar, to deal and contain the armed forces, tribal groups and the forces of the former regime. Not to mention the political use of the institutions of the de facto House of Representatives and the High Council of State to obstruct and détente processes.
Let us not forget that the two parties are concerned with the ability to correctly read the reality of international changes and their impact on the crisis. This leads us to the importance of understanding and analyzing internal political crises.
Maps of internal political crises
The succession and succession of governments after the February 2011 revolution, Its inability to meet the political entitlements that qualify the country for stability reflects the state of difficulties facing Libyan society in drawing a political life for a state that possesses privacy. In that it owns the institutions of power and not the institutions of the state, Libya has not experienced the state of political modernization that the state is supposed to experience.
The former regime also established institutions to protect power and did not care to instill the value of the state and the supremacy of the law. The existence of a constitution, the value of political participation, visions to reduce corruption and the relationship of the individual to power, the absence of parties and the relationship of the tribe with the state, The system of centralization and decentralization of all these values was logical to develop and work for their revival in society so that there is a political life that realizes societal balance and achieves political stability[6].
Let us not forget that the continuous structural change of Libyan institutions has lost their ability to continue thinking and building and negatively affected the political culture of society. and deprived it of opportunities for natural development and access to the emergence of a modern democratic and civil political culture, This has made the country today lacking what it needs to face the crisis of revival, which is a prerequisite for democracy and the process of state-building[7].
This heavy inheritance reflected directly on society and the state after the February revolution, Society is not familiar with the culture of dialogue, but the culture of violence and exclusion has taken root in its mentality. Consequently, confidence has been lost and it has become a scene of improvisation and the absence of a clear vision, All this followed the post-revolution years until we came to say that they were years of inability to move from revolution to state[8].
Even with the presence of parties and civil society organizations, Libyan society in its political primitiveness continued to rely on the traditional sources and tools of power in the tribe, its heritage and expectations. Maximizing factional and regional interests over the public interest. We can say that the rotation of nine prime ministers since November 2011 and June 2023 is evidence of the depth of the political crises plaguing Libya, but we are trying to set determinants for these crises as follows:
1 – Political division:
The division in the Libyan scene has many roots, which lie in the climate of mistrust experienced by Libyan society in the relationship of the authority with the components of society in the three stages of the state. This has accumulated feelings of marginalization as a result of centralization, The growing phenomenon of corruption deepened these negative feelings after the February 2011 revolution. With the spread of weapons chaos, the encroachment of militias and the inability of political and military forces to achieve societal harmony and social peace in order to achieve national reconciliation, The reason for this is the lack of real sovereignty of the Libyan state, Since 2011, the Libyan political class has not been able to escape the control of regional and international external powers[9].
Political power also could not, Managing scenes of political and ideological differences between Libyan forces and parties, This has lost the national interest of the state and the opportunities to preserve Libya’s political unity have been lost. Not to mention that this class is pursuing its regional and personal interests has become ready to do anything, even if it is the blood and food of the Libyans, and the evidence is numerous that gives us a realistic view of all this tampering practiced by all Libyan forces[10].
Realistically and practically perpetuated the reality of the political division in Libya when it became employing state organs and institutions for the benefit of the political class and its narrow interests in control, influence and blackmail, May 2014 is considered a dangerous turning point in the Libyan state, coinciding with the confusion that accompanied the elections and their legitimacy, in which the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional. This resulted in a political deadlock that ultimately led to the division of the legislative and executive powers between the General National Congress in Tripoli, the Tobruk House of Representatives for the legislative authority, an executive government in Al-Bayda called the Interim and the National Salvation Government in Tripoli. It was then that everyone, both domestically and internationally, realized the difficulty of producing a unified government that could extend its authority over the entire territory of the country.
Based on this, Libya has entered a new phase, The United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIL) played an important role in it, as the Libyan governments became subject to negotiations sponsored by the United Nations, aware of the necessity and importance of the representation of these selected governments of the real actors in the Libyan scene until stability is achieved and the political division ends.
This stage was through two stations, the first was through the Skhirat [11] agreement, which established the Government of National Accord and sponsored in its members the representation of the conflicting parties, as mentioned earlier.
However, the political agreement was not respected, culminating in the House of Representatives’ rejection of the Skhirat Agreement and the 04/04/2019 war on Tripoli, which was led by General Haftar with the support of international and regional powers. Despite the fact that Libyans are waiting for the inclusive conference called by the United Nations in Ghadames to bring the visions of the Libyan parties closer.
The second stop was through the Geneva Agreement, which established the Government of National Unity, which we also referred to its actors and parties previously, and whose main objective was to truce it and calm the situation that would establish a post-war government, which was subject to political tensions and blackmail, which is the advantage of interactions in the Libyan political scene. As a result, this political division led to a new and dangerous crisis on the maps of Libyan crises.
2- Institutional division:
The institutional division is one of the most serious crises that threaten the entity and unity of the Libyan state. Especially with regard to financial, economic, security and military institutions, which have deepened the absence of a single vision that recognizes national security strategies in their full dimensions.
The existence of two banking institutions has increased the living difficulties of Libyans related to inflation as a result of the existence of parallel markets. As well as the destruction of the value of the Libyan dinar through currency printing and the absence of an economic vision to address the liquidity crisis, And the crisis of the repeated closures of oil sources and their use for political blackmail and the maximization of regional and factional interests.
As for the security situation today, it reflects itself strongly in front of the public scene, He feeds on the Libyan crisis and nourishes it at the same time, The lack of law and order, the proliferation of armed groups, the limited decisions of the security and justice sectors, and the division of the armed forces[12].
The nature of the security situation is actually dramatically changing. This makes it difficult to draw a stable map of the conflicts between the Libyan parties. The scene, despite the passage of 12 years, is still taking shape, Not to mention that conflicts have many features and will leave their mark on the process of drafting the constitution, The distribution of the future, power and influence is expected to become one of the fiercest disagreements. In addition to the issues of decentralization, federalism and the rights of ethnic minorities[13].
There is likely to be a frightening conflict over religious identity in the sense of which religious approach the nascent state will adopt. The arenas of this conflict are the media and religious platforms and state institutions *, while the means are numerous in light of the possession of all these religious currents weapons and power on the ground.
3- The crisis of the constitution:
The crisis of not drafting and agreeing on the constitution is one of the chronic crises that society and the state suffer from in Libya. The absence of a constitution regulating the state is a heavy legacy that Libyans inherited from an authority that ruled the country for 42 years. This is why the controversy and negative repercussions have been accompanied by the entitlement of a constitution that regulates political life in Libya for the 12 years of the revolution. Libyans have not been able to move from chaos and revolution to the state of constitution and state and finish the transitional phases that have dominated the Libyan scene to this day.
The Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly has commenced its legal mandate since its election in April 2014, with equal electoral representation among the three regions of Libya at 20 per region, It is contrary to the customary in the drafting of constitutions in terms of representation in the constitution body, usually proportional to the number of inhabitants on the one hand, On the other hand, the election process that took place for the Constitution Drafting Commission reflected negatively on the Constitution Commission through the lack of constitutional experience such as some members of the Committee[14], which made it exceed the legal deadlines for its work.
Whereas the Constitution Commission began its work at the height of the political division, This resulted in many political polarizations that directly affected the work of the Commission. The differences prompted the Chairman of the Authority, Dr. Ali Tarhouni, to adopt a controversial draft that was out of the deliberations of the Working Committee, which ultimately led to a judicial complaint that resulted in the dismissal of Dr. Tarhouni.[15]
Many meetings tried to advance the work of the Constitution Commission and restore its work, However, internal and external challenges have posed obstacles in its performance even to the submission of the draft constitution to a referendum. But it seems that the deep differences in the constitution document are not technical but rather issues that need political consensus. Therefore, it has become important to adopt alternative political frameworks in which the drafting of the constitution is linked to the political process. The presumption of a rupture between the two lacked the factual logic with which such issues were supposed to be addressed.
In summary, the difficulty of agreeing on the establishment of an effective central state framed by an acceptable constitution, gaining legitimacy, uniting the country’s institutions and making the power of coercion in the hands of the state is the general feature that can be monitored and analyzed. At the same time, Libyan institutions suffer from a lack of professionalism. It relies on personalization and ideology and does not believe in the supremacy of law and the civil state. Not to mention that Libyan armed groups are employed by the political class that implements regional and international agendas. This leads us to the importance of trying to analyze the paths of the settlement as proposed by the Libyan internal parties.
Third: Settlement Paths Proposed by the Libyan Parties
The failure that Haftar al-Askari carried on the capital to seize power in Libya made international and regional powers pay attention to a realistic reality that governs the Libyan scene, which is the difficulty of military resolution. At the same time, the Libyan forces, especially Khalifa, were forced to engage in the settlement tracks, employing the House of Representatives, sometimes at the official level and at other times informally. But it is essential and important in charting the true course of the settlement, And do not forget the use of the (5 + 5) committee, which is the military committee, which Khalifa Haftar saw as a way to gain time or opportunities to return to his dream of control and influence, taking advantage of the perceptions of the paths of settlement that it proposes. Regional parties, especially Egypt and the Arab Emirates.
On the other hand, the Government of National Unity, which came after the state of truce and calm imposed by the international powers after the Geneva Agreement, is moving. which have a relative potential for movement and behavior, However, it bases its movement and behavior on the style of political deals carried out by shadow figures and pressure forces that adopt informal methods and are far from putting forward settlement initiatives.
Finally, it can be said that the paths of settlement have always been based on the sharing of power, money and wealth. However, it is noticeable that the High Council of State, as an advisory body based in Tripoli, which is one of the elements of the settlement, is inconsistent in its initiatives and behaviors with the Government of National Unity nor the Presidential Council, which lacks the main effectiveness that qualifies it to play a vital role in the Libyan scene.
In fact, the granting of confidence to the Government of National Unity by Parliament in March 2021, Moving the country to a new transitional phase, which is the fifth[16]. And the creation of a kind of calm that did not cancel the state of division, especially in the lack of submission of Khalifa Haftar to the nascent government and his ability to influence the behavior of the parliament, and his permanent desire to obtain privileges and personal and factional interests, which reduced the opportunities of the Government of National Unity to exercise powers and competencies throughout Libya and became exercising these competencies in a narrow scope in the northwest of Libya, and as a result the political gap deepened again and the parliament withdrew confidence from the government and assigned the government of Mr. Fathi Bashagha.
His appointment to head the government is a shuffling of cards and confusion of the confused and complex political scene, through which Haftar and his team in the House of Representatives aimed at the possibility of blackmailing inside and outside the country. At the same time, the Government of National Unity has not been able to have the ability to set national priorities within the framework of a vision aimed at action and achievement and proposes specific paths for a political settlement that also moves away from narrow visions. It had only one way: informal power-sharing meetings with Khalifa Haftar.
It can be said that the settlement stations that the Libyan parties went to in international conferences, most of which were due to the division of power, influence and wealth, and they did not yet have the establishment of a settlement scene that accommodates everyone and enhances the lost opportunities for trust. All these parties are doing is to adopt tactics, evasion and prolongation of the crisis. So that the institutions and agencies that have become suffering from the crisis of legitimacy and inability continue to produce visions of settlement, Interestingly, the talk about settlement and conflict scenarios seems equal, Given the overlap of the political and military tracks in the Libyan crisis, the relationship between the two is closer to the relationship of action and reaction.[17].
The recent conversion of the Libyan parties to dialogue and settlement came as a result of the United States pushing the efforts of the UN envoy of the Secretary-General to advance the Libyan settlement process and move it from the stalemate that hit it to the possibility of holding elections that would give birth to a new government that can contain the Libyan parties. and to play the role of demanding and coordinating the departure of the Wagner forces, whose presence has become a growing concern for U.S. interests in Africa, Therefore, the United States is more likely than ever to correct the factors in the Libyan scene and advance the tracks of the Libyan settlement. The U.S. diplomatic and legislative mobility is evidence of the United States’ pursuit and commitment to the importance of stabilizing Libya through the adoption of the U.S. Congress.
(Adoption of the Deutsche Act *, which contains U.S. support for supporting a peaceful resolution of the Libyan conflict, deterring foreign interference in Libya, punishing those who obstruct peace and violate human rights, as well as U.S. support for good governance and anti-corruption, and pushing for free and fair [18] elections.
In this context, the UN envoy Abdullah Batili presented an initiative aimed at embarrassing the House of Representatives and the Supreme Council and not providing them with the opportunity to maneuver and pushing them to the need to agree on a constitutional basis on which elections are based. Directing Libyan public opinion towards a fundamental issue, which is the importance of holding elections, and the need to continue to create national reconciliation sponsored by the Presidential Council and the African Union[19].
It seems that the UN envoy is strongly aware that there are real problems related to the visions of the State Council and deputies. Therefore, as part of his initiative that there is another way to decide the path of settlement, hinting at the possibility of bypassing the two chambers in the event of disagreement on a constitutional basis and moving to presidential elections and two parliaments, Therefore, the two councils sought to form a committee (6 + 6) to agree on controversial issues that are seen as an obstacle to the holding of elections.
The end:
After three overlapping methodological stations through which we tried to understand and analyze maps, crises and settlement paths that mark the Libyan scene, affect its issues, and determine the map of the options of its parties in dealing and behavior on that, we conclude the following results:
The nature of the conflict between the Libyan parties reflects the ability of external parties to influence the behaviors and facilities decided by local forces.
– The nature of the scene is complex and the possibility of surprises due to the nature of the Libyan society that is not structured and organized within civil society organizations and parties capable of providing visions for the paths of settlement and stability.
Since May 2014, conflicts between Libyans have entered a dangerous juncture, as regional powers have played a crucial role in co-opting Libyan conflicting parties and dictating their agendas. At the same time, the possibility of using the military solution to liquidate the opponents increased, leading to the most violent and dangerous attack on the capital that took place on 04/04/2019.
–that the parties’ perceptions of a political solution and settlement are often linked to the desire for personal and factional privileges and interests, National visions that adopt the goals of Libyan national security were absent in its comprehensive dimensions.
Libyan institutions are living in two cases, the first related to the crisis of legitimacy and the expiration and legal deadlines for it, The other concerns the desire of its leaders to continue to perpetuate the principle of fait accompli politics, which the international community has come to deal with for fear of political vacuum, chaos and the unknown.
Armed groups in Libya after twelve years have changed their tactics in dealing with the organs of state institutions from direct coercion to direct involvement in assuming office, The heads of these groups became at the head of security and professional institutions.
Libya faces many challenges related to the identification of the national identity and political personality of the State, The lack of constants and defining the features of the Libyan personality created the conflict phenomenon that embodied the lack of consensus on the religious methodology. as well as the lack of agreement on the description of history and events in the past and present, It will reflect negatively on the prospects that should simulate the future and set positive visions for state building.
– Predicting the areas and paths of settlement in Libya is very difficult due to the rapid pace of events in Libya, the Libyan scene and the multiplicity of influencers.
Research recommendations:
– The necessity and importance of civil society organizations and political parties to play their main role in developing political awareness and formulating national ideas and visions that include unifying institutions and agreeing on the foundations of national reconciliation in order to draft a constitution that ends the prevailing state of political division.
The Libyan forces should realize that the solution must stem from the pure national will that gives priority to the national interest and national security issues.
– The importance of the Libyan parties moving away from the policy of polarization practiced by external powers, in the Libyan arena so that Libya can be removed from the arena of conflicts and regional and international scores settled.
– Taking advantage of the state of change and contradiction between international powers in achieving areas of stability and consensus around society and the state in Libya.
[1] Ahmed Qasim Hussein, et al. Libya: the challenges of democratic transition and the crisis of state-building, Arab Center for Research and Studies, First edition, December 2022, p. 167.
[2] Mahmoud Abdel Wahed, The positioning of political and military forces in Libya and the future of the conflict, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, August 4, 2016, See at:
[3] Sameh Rashid, The Consequences of the Libyan Crisis between War and Politics, Arab Affairs, Issue (187), League of Arab States, p. 94, p. 95.
[4] Ahmed Badawi, Risks of dismantling the state: Libya between the harbingers of democratic transition, Cairo, Arab Center for Research and Studies, 14 January 2016, See: www.acrse.org/39813 , The website was accessed on (1/6/2023).
[5] Sameh Rashid, op. cit., P96.
[6] Abdul Wahab Al-Har, The Libyan Crisis between the Challenges of the Past and the Present and Future Scenarios, Second European Conference, Berlin, 12-11 March 2022, European Center for Middle East Studies.
[7] Mohammed Al-Sheikh, The problem of the faltering democratic transition in Libya after 2011, Jordan’s suspicion Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Issue (68), Center for Middle Eastern Studies 2014, P63.
[8] Abdul Wahab Al-Har, Op. cit.
[9] Mohammed Al-Sheikh, Libya in light of the UN efforts from Adrian Bilt to Ghassan Salamé, is there a logical approach to bring the parties together, Proceedings of the Sixth Conference on Historical Studies, Tripoli, December 8, 2019, Publications of the Libyan Center for Research and Studies, First edition, 2021 p. 372.
[10] Anas Jaballah, The economic effects of Libya’s political division, Libyan Policy Organization, Tripoli, 13/6/2016.
[11] To view the provisions of the agreement, see the Libyan Political Agreement, Signed on 17 December 2015, See at: https//unsmil.unmissions.org
[12] Report of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Security Council, September 2014, p. 21, see:
unsmil.unmissions.org/ar
[13] Wolfram Lagarre, “Global Studies: The cracks of the Libyan revolution, the active forces, blocs and conflicts in the new Libya”, Issue (120), Emirates Center for Strategic Studies 2014, P62.
* The conflict between Dar al-Iftaand the Awqaf Authority, as well as the existence of religious schools affiliated with these religious currents, not to mention the presence of armed battalions that follow these currents, which portends dire consequences for the Libyan scene.
[14] Nadira Sharif, The Libyan constitution between conflict and concessions, April 2021, p. 07, See at:
European university
[15] Al-Bayda Court of Appeal cancels Tarhouni’s membership in the Constitution Drafting Committee due to his possession of two nationalities Al-Bayda Court of Appeal, See at: EAYBA—APPEALS-COURT-SACKS-HEAD
[16] Senussi Biskari, “Eleven years since the Libyan February 17 revolution: paths, stumbling blocks, outcomes”, Al Jarida Center for Studies, March, 2022, p. 183.
[17] Mohammed Khalfan Al-Sawafi, The crisis in Libya: Map of the conflict, its developments and future paths, Trend Research & Consulting, See at: Trendthesearch.org
* Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in the US House of Representatives.
[18] What do you know about the Libya Stability Law? Africa News Portal, See at:
afrijatenews.net
[19] Abdulaziz Al-Wasli, after the Bateley initiative and the threat of the Security Council…. What future awaits the political process in Libya, see:
* The contentious issues are dual nationality , the importance of military candidacy and the laws regulating elections.
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